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Summary: A professional and competent public administration is necessary for success-
ful transition from a socialist, centrally planned economy to a functioning market de-
mocracy. The difficulty lies in building an organized and effective civil service sector. 
This paper gives a brief overview of formal bureaucratic reasoning, beginning with Nis-
kanen’s theory, followed by the principal-agent model. The “Weberian state hypothesis,” 
which provides an alternative view of bureaucracies in less developed countries, is sub-
sequently explored. Finally, the currant state of Serbian public administration is de-
scribed, along with a discussion of challenges to be addressed in the future. 
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Introduction 
 
The transition from a centrally planned socialist economy to a functioning mar-
ket democracy requires significant institutional reform. This can entail creation 
of wholly new organizations in addition to revision of the existing political and 
economic institutions. Professional and legally bound public administration is 
necessary to achieve these ends.  
       Under Communist rule, the civil service sector of Central and Eastern 
European countries and the Soviet Union were highly politicized. State admini-
stration became only an implementation apparatus with no role in policymaking. 
Civil service agencies were under the full political governance of the Communist 
party. In Yugoslavia, however, this situation was somewhat different because its 
bureaucracy has long been impartial, even under Communist rule. Miloshevic’s 
authoritarian regime undermined this tradition during the last decade (Verheijen 
and Rabrenovic, 2001). After the democratic changes of Serbia in October 2000, 
the new government was faced with a challenge to reform its civil service sector. 
Despite numerous initiatives to improve bureaucratic structures, the Serbian 
public administration system remained largely unchanged. 
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       This paper describes the features of a well-organized and effective bu-
reaucracy, and illustrates Serbia’s status relative to this ideal. Section two out-
lines formal reasoning regarding bureaucracy, beginning with Niskanen’s theory 
followed by the principal-agent model. These two theories were chosen because 
of their long-held acceptance. Section three explains the “Weberian state hy-
pothesis”, an alternative view pertaining to the bureaucracies of less developed 
countries. Section four unites theory with empirical findings about Serbian pub-
lic administration and explains challenges that must be addressed in the future. 
 
 
1. Theoretical Framework 
 
Niskanen (1971) was the first public choice theorist to model the behavior of 
bureaucracies. His theory rests on the following assumptions.  First, the bureau 
has a virtual monopoly on true supply cost information.  Second, the bureau 
knows the legislature’s demand for the bureau’s services. These assumptions 
allow agencies to make all-or-nothing offers (concerning both the budget and 
output) to the legislature. Consequently, the budget of a bureau would always be 
above the point where marginal public benefits (from the activities performed by 
the bureau) equal marginal costs. In other words, it is assumed that the bureau’s 
principal objective is to secure an ever-larger budget. At the same time, the 
agency is determined to produce an output above the social optimal level.  
     As demonstrated by Mueller (2003, p.363-364) this concept may be ex-
pressed mathematically. The budget of the bureau is a function of the final out-
put of the bureau’s services. This function could be regarded as a public benefit 
which, as the first and second derivations show, increases with increasing out-
put, but at a diminishing rate. If P is the agency’s budget, then: 
 
P=P(q), P'>0, P''<0                                                                                                   
(1) 
 
On the other hand, the agency has a cost function T that increases at an increas-
ing rate: 
 
T=T(q), T'>0, T''>0                                                                                                   
(2) 
 
        The fact that agencies can make take-it-or-leave-it proposals to the legis-
lature results in bureaucrats having exclusive knowledge pertaining to this cost 
function. The legislature is consequently handicapped in its ability to determine 
whether the output of the agency reflects the socially optimal level. Therefore, 
the bureau can maximize its budget with only one constraint, to cover the 
output’s total costs, that is:  Bureaucratic Behavior: A Review of the Theory and its Application to Serbian Public… 
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max P(q) 
s.t. P(q) = T(q) 
Z=P(q)+λ(P(q)-T(q)) 
P’(q)= λ/1+λ T’(q) 
 
From the sponsor’s perspective, the optimal condition requires that P’(q)=T’(q), 
but because the Lagrangian multiplier is a positive value, P’< T’.   
       As Mueller asserts, Niskanen’s theory was a pioneering effort to model 
bureaucratic behavior, but new theories later emerged with different assumptions 
and hence, conclusions. Of particular interest is the principal-agent model. It is 
necessary before proceeding to clarify some simplifications on which Nis-
kanen’s analysis rests.  
      First, as noted by Bendor and Moe (1985, p.756) Niskanen assumes that 
decision makers in both the agency and the legislature base their choices on 
complex mathematics. These calculations would be beyond the capacity of most 
persons. Second, Niskanen’s analysis rests on the assumption of perfect informa-
tion on the part of the agency. There is only information asymmetry between the 
bureau and the legislature. In other words, agencies hold all the cards.   
          Niskanen developed his theory on neoclassical grounds, so it is under-
standable that he uses this premise. Additionally, formal modeling requires the 
adoption of simplifications like these. The quest for a more realistic paradigm of 
bureaucratic behavior leads us to principal-agent models.     
        The  principal-agent  framework recognizes the hierarchical relationship 
between bureaus and the legislature, with the legislature as a principal and the bu-
reau as its agent (Moe 1984, p.770). Politicians, acting as principals, are more 
powerful than Niskanen asserts, since in reality they issue orders, control the 
agenda, create the incentive structure, etc. Moreover, these models accept the no-
tion of information asymmetry. This results in greater attention being paid to the 
incentive scheme and monitoring instruments. These schemes are used to mitigate 
the asymmetry and hence confront the problems of hidden action and hidden in-
formation (Moe 1984, p.766). In other words, for problems of political control of 
bureaucracy, principal-agent models are better suited than Niskanen’s theory.  
        These models are used to explain the relationship between upper level 
bureaucrats and their subordinates. Namely, the existence of the residual (profit) 
motivates the manager to control his team members in private firms. In the same 
manner, principal-agent theory implies that the slack, the difference between the 
true costs of a bureau’s services and what the bureau actually spends, can be 
used as an instrument of internal control (Moe 1984, p.763). 
              Incentives are of great importance in principal-agent models because 
they serve as a monitoring and control mechanism. However, risk aversion on 
the part of subordinates can make incentives expensive and/or inefficient. Simi-
larly, Holstrom (1982) argues that asymmetric information would cripple im-Jelena Žarković-Rakić 
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plementation of any incentive scheme that could reconcile organizational effi-
ciency with the self-interest of individuals. 
       Finally, in low-income countries there is a lack of political will on the 
part of the principals to create and implement strategies that will induce better 
performance of agents. Moreover, corrupt governments are not motivated to en-
gage in their serious monitoring, which makes principal-agent approach less ap-
plicable (Rauch and Evans 2000, p. 51). The principal-agent approach could be 
implemented in these countries but only after significant structural reform of 
their bureaucracies. The Weberian approach to bureaucratic reform (Rauch and 
Evans; 1999, 2000) attempts to define the administrative structures likely to in-
duce economic growth. The next section is dedicated to this line of reasoning.   
    
   
2. Weberian State Hypothesis
1 
 
As mentioned earlier, Niskanen’s work was a pioneering effort within neoclassi-
cal political economy. It aimed to describe the functioning of the bureaucracy 
and its impact on the growth of government. Following this man’s arguments, 
many later theorists viewed bureaucrats and politicians as rational agents en-
gaged in budget maximization and thus inefficient spending. The allocation of 
financial resources controlled by them, according to this view, is vulnerable to 
corruption and clientelism, rather than motivation to serve the public interest. 
Few theorists within this branch of literature view politicians and bureaucrats as 
altruistic, honest individuals driven by good intentions and harboring high values 
and principles.   
The question of which state structures are necessary in a country pro-
moting economic growth was long subservient to interest directed at the proper 
model to describe bureaucratic behavior. Despite this, economists such as Knack 
and Keefer, (1994) Rodrik, (1999) and Kaufmann (2004) began focusing their 
attention on basic principles of good governance. Knack and Keefer (1994) 
measured the quality of governance using indicators such as government repu-
diation of contracts, risk of expropriation, corruption, rule of law, and bureau-
cratic quality. 
       By the mid-1990s there was a growing consensus, among economists 
studying market transitions, that a suitable government structure is a precondi-
tion for successful reform. Formulation and implementation of both broad and 
specific macroeconomic policies necessitate a professional and effective public 
administration. In order to fulfill these complex tasks it was necessary to define 
basic principles on which good public administration should rest. 
Max Weber, one of the influential founders of classical administrative 
thought, viewed the bureaucracy, independent from societal pressures, as a full-
                                                 
1 This section is largely based on Evans and Rauch (1999;2000) and Ahrens (2002). Bureaucratic Behavior: A Review of the Theory and its Application to Serbian Public… 
  239 
time agency devoted to administrative tasks. He believed that an administra-
tion’s duties need specific definitions, and that such policies are vital in the con-
struction of an advanced market economy (Ahrens 2002, p.142). Building on 
Weber’s insights about public administration, Evans and Rauch (1999, p.752) 
define the Weberian-type bureaucracy as featuring the following institutional 
characteristics: 
1.  meritocratic recruitment of personnel based on their education and 
competitive examinations, 
2.  predictable prospects of long-term career rewards,  
3.  strictly defined, non-overlapping jurisdiction of each public admini-
stration within the state apparatus.      
In their empirical testing of characteristics of bureaucracy most related 
to good economic performance, Evans and Rauch choose meritocratic recruit-
ment and predictable and rewarding career ladders. These factors were selected 
based on the ease by which they could be measured across countries. Evans and 
Rauch argue that meritocratic recruitment results in minimal personnel compe-
tence. Moreover, these employees typically eschew the agency’s norms and val-
ues. The latter is of great importance for the creation of esprit de corps among 
bureaucrats and their sense of loyalty to the organization. In other words, meri-
tocratic recruitment and promotion contribute to the development of the corpo-
rate identity among bureaucrats. This in turn increases the cost of corrupt behav-
ior. Making this activity less attractive for public officials would reduce the im-
plicit tax on the private sector, which is nearly 20% of entrepreneurial revenue in 
transitional countries (World Bank, 2004). Furthermore, since meritocratic pro-
cedures can attract more talented individuals and increase their integrity and 
level of professionalism. Therefore, competent public officers are better able to 
help private entrepreneurs to overcome problems of coordination and collective 
action. This is especially true when they are entering new markets.  
        Corporate coherence and minimization of corrupt activity is also facili-
tated by predictable long-term career rewards. These also contribute to a bu-
reaucracy’s propensity to invest in infrastructure rather than spend resources on 
personal promotion. 
       
 
3. Serbian Public Administration: Current State of Affairs and Challenges 
to be Addressed in the Future   
 
This paper has analyzed dominant theories of bureaucratic behavior. It began 
with paradigms that for a long time represented the mainstream view of public 
administration. Niskanen’s theory, developed on neoclassical grounds, viewed 
civil servants as public officials whose rational political behavior may translate 
into economically irrational actions. Furthermore, as Prokopijevic (2000, p. 71-
78) asserts, if we accept the methodological individualism on which public Jelena Žarković-Rakić 
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choice theory rests, it is hard to accept the notion that the principal objective of 
the bureaucrats is to serve the public interest. Bureaucrats, like other political 
participants (politicians, voters), are interested in the maximization of their own 
utility. In pursuit of material well-being, bureaucrats try to maximize resources 
under their control and allocate them according to their own demands (Ahrens 
2002, p. 43). 
      Niskanen’s theory has been criticized on several grounds, mostly be-
cause it asserts that bureaucracy holds all the cards, whereas in reality legislature 
is the principal and therefore has greater authority. This is recognized in the 
principal-agent model. The main contribution of this model to bureaucratic the-
ory has been the notion of legislature-agency information asymmetry. The model 
pays special attention to the incentive scheme and monitoring instruments which 
mitigate this asymmetry. By doing this, problems of hidden action and hidden 
information are neutralized. 
       In young democracies there are few checks and balances to limit the cor-
rupt behavior of their politicians. Moreover, lack of political will on the part of 
the principals (politicians) to create and implement strategies that will induce 
better performance of agents, and to engage in their serious monitoring, make 
the principal-agent approach less applicable in these countries. In fact, the prin-
cipal-agent model could be implemented but only after significant bureaucratic 
reform in these countries. The Weberian approach could serve as a guiding prin-
ciple for reform and explain on what grounds this approach rests.  
        This section connects theory with empirical findings regarding Serbian 
civil services. The following is an outline of the primary flaws within Serbian 
public administration.  
           First, there are some characteristics of Serbian bureaucracy that mark-
edly correspond to Niskanen’s theory. Namely, within Serbian civil service the 
minister and his employees make one team, and they seek as many resources as 
possible so as to improve the position of their Ministry within the government. 
To secure this position they seek ever-larger budgets, more employees than nec-
essary, better facilities, etc. This behavior usually leads to an inefficient alloca-
tion of resources (Sevic 2001, p.318).  
        Second, Serbian agencies rarely share the same institutional features as 
Weberian bureaucracies. For example, meritocratic recruitment of personnel is 
not a guiding principle of Serbian administration. Ideally, civil service is apoliti-
cal and professional; in reality close connections and/or membership in the 
dominant parties can help enrolment and advancement within the administration. 
At the same time, little job security exists. After a ruling party loses an election, 
the careers of current employees are placed at risk. Sweeping reforms and tre-
mendous turnover commonly occur when the reigns of government change 
hands (Sevic 2001, p.313). The World Bank reached a similar conclusion. This 
institution’s research (World Bank 2004, p.17) shows that within Serbian ad-
ministration current senior management positions are mainly politicized and do Bureaucratic Behavior: A Review of the Theory and its Application to Serbian Public… 
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not allow the development of a senior civil service. It is the Secretary General 
and Assistant Ministers that are usually held by political appointees, and they are 
the first to be replaced after the new minister’s arrival. The World Bank warns 
that this kind of politicization has hampered effective management of ministries, 
with an adverse effect on both policymaking and implementation processes.  
        Finally, Serbian civil service fails to meet the third characteristic of We-
berian bureaucracy because jurisdictions of public administrations are not 
strictly defined and indeed often overlap (Kavran and Rakic 2001, p.5). Other 
important features of Serbian civil service include widespread problems of moti-
vation, a shortage of administrative equipment and infrastructure, weak mecha-
nisms for inter-ministerial coordination, a rule-oriented, risk-averse administra-
tive culture, and strong centralization of decision-making authority (Eriksen 
2005, p.6). At the same time, according to Eriksen’s research, Serbian adminis-
trative reform is overly legalistic and he believes that excessive legalism makes 
civil service rigid and hard to change.    
                The remuneration system present in Serbian public administration is 
another feature needing reformed. The contemporary salary system does not 
provide sufficient motivation for young qualified staffers to remain in the ad-
ministration. At the same time, this system is costly, as Serbia maintains a high 
public sector wage bill in relation to GDP. The World Bank (2004, p.18) pro-
poses “the reform of incentive structures should make remuneration packages 
more attractive and more performance-based, while containing the fiscal cost of 
the system”. The World Bank (2004, p.10) also declares that “Serbia has made 
limited progress in reforming its public administration system, which could en-
danger formulation and implementation of future economic and social policies. 
Key conditions for effective reform are the adoption of a clear administrative 
reform strategy and action plan, and the creation of a reform management struc-
ture with clearly assigned responsibilities and accountability. Only after com-
pleting these two conditions, Serbia would be prepared to build merit-based and 
de-politicized civil service.”  
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Teorije birokratije i njihova primena na slučaju državne administracije u 
Srbiji 
 
Rezime: Jedan od osnovnih preduslova uspešne tranzicije od socijalističkih, centralno- 
planskih privreda ka vidu tržišne demokratije jeste postojanje profesionalne i kvalitetne  
javne uprave. Pitanje je, međutim, kako izgraditi efektivnu i na pravilima zasnovanu 
državnu administraciju? Namera nam je da u kratkim crtama analiziramo neke od najis-
taknutijih teorija birokratije. Za početak prikazaćemo osnovne karakteristike Niskane-
nove teorije, a potom i principal-agent modela. U nastavku, objasnićemo tzv. Veberijan-
ski pristup reformi državne uprave, koji predstavlja alternativni pogled na poželjne 
karakteristike birokratije i koji je prilagođen zemljama na niskom nivou dohotka. 
Poslednji deo rada bavi se trenutnim stanjem javne uprave u Srbiji i izazovima sa kojima 
će se naša administracija suočiti u budućnosti. 
 
Ključne reči: Birokratija, Niskanenova teorija, Principal-agent model, Veberijanski pris-
tup reformi državne uprave, Javna uprava u Srbiji  
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